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a b s t r a c t
Preference elicitation methods require respondents to predict the impact a change in health might have
on their future selves. The focus on the change in health is at the possible expense of other experiences
of life once in that health state. We analyse personal preferences to a pairwise choice task involving
trade-offs between quality and length of life, where satisfaction levels with life or health are introduced
in the description of the health states. We ﬁnd that a health scenario including low levels of satisfaction
increases the likelihoodof preferring todie sooner in full health,whereas scenarios includinghigh levels of
satisfaction increase the likelihood of preferring to live for longer in poor health. The differences highlight
the sensitivity of preferences to what is described in health states and therefore show the importance83
1
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of on-going discussions about precisely what respondents should be asked to consider in preference
elicitation studies.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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. Introduction
Gains in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) are a well-
stablished way of capturing the beneﬁts of health care in a single
etric that combines quality of lifewith length of life. They are cur-
ently used by many health technology assessment (HTA) agencies
round the world – most notably the National Institute for Health
nd Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK – to assist in the allocation
f scarce health care resources.
A critical question in the valuation of QALYs is how best to
escribe health in such a way that allows comparisons across a
road range of health conditions. One of the most widely used
ealth state descriptive systems (and the one recommended by
ICE) is the EQ-5D, which describes health in terms of three levels
essentially no, moderate, and severe problems) of ﬁve dimensions
mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxi-
ty/depression) (Brooks, 1996).
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 02079557453.
E-mail address: g.kavetsos@lse.ac.uk (G. Kavetsos).
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Open access under CC BY licensePreferences over composite EQ-5D health states are often then
licited from the general public, and sometimes from patients,
sing the standard gamble (SG) and/or time trade-off (TTO)method
Torrance, 1986). Many HTA agencies recommend the use of pub-
ic values; that is, preferences over hypothetical health states. In
rinciple, these methods place all health states on an interval scale
etween 0 (for dead) and 1 (for full health), thus allowing for the
alculation of QALYs – see Dolan (1997) for an EQ-5D ‘tariff’ based
n TTO valuations from the UK general public and Tsuchiya et al.
2006) for a comparison of methods used to elicit preferences.
Typical preference elicitation studies present the respondents
ith hypothetical health states described, for instance by EQ-5D,
ith no further information. In particular, they give no indication
f how the experience of living in the health state is to be perceived
Dolan and Kahneman, 2008). This raises the question of whether
reference-based valuation studies could more fully communi-
ate the longer-term impacts. So this study seeks to elicit ‘more
nformed’ preferences obtained via a TTO that incorporates vari-
us levels of satisfaction with life or health alongside the standard
ealth state descriptors.Measures of satisfaction with life or health have been widely
sed to assess subjective well-being (Sumner, 1996; Diener et al.,
999). The measures have been shown to be associated with many
ife events and circumstances in ways that would be predicted
.
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Dolan et al., 2008) and the responses correlate well with other
easures, such as the reports of other people (Sandvik et al., 1993)
nd brain activity (Sutton and Davidson, 1997; Urry et al., 2004).
ncorporating this information in a health state description offers a
oncise and informative way of communicating the experience of
iving in a hypothetical state of health. It is important then to see
hat effect including satisfaction with life or health in the descrip-
ion of a health state scenario – alongside its EQ-5D health state
nd duration – has on the preferences people express over it.
Our approach differs from studies focusing speciﬁcally on dis-
arities attributed to framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman,
981) due, for example, to labelling condition-speciﬁc preference-
ased measures (Rowen et al., 2012) and framing of SG and
TO scenarios in terms of losses or gains (Blumenschein and
ohannesson, 1998; Stalmeier and Bezembinder, 1999). Our paper
ay be interpreted as exploring the effect of adding a “bolt-on”
tem on to the EQ-5D that provides additional information on the
ypothetical scenario being valued – for example, Krabbe et al.
1999), Wolfs et al. (2007) and Yang et al. (forthcoming) include
dditional dimensions in the EQ-5D description system, such as a
ognitiveor ‘sleep’ dimension. In contrast to thesepapers, our study
bolts-on” important overall experiences of a person’s life.
Against this background, the primary question in this paper
s: are health state preferences inﬂuenced by satisfaction levels in
hose states? In addition, an individual’s current health satisfaction
nd life satisfaction might also be important explanatory variables
n their preferences. Sowe additionally ask: are health state values,
hich contain satisfaction levels, inﬂuenced by the respondent’s
wn satisfaction level?
The next section describes the data and methods used. Sec-
ion 3 presents the results of the analysis. We ﬁnd that a health
cenario that includes low levels of satisfaction increases the like-
ihood of preferring to die sooner in full health. Similarly, scenarios
hat include high levels of satisfaction signiﬁcantly increase the
ikelihood of preferring to live for a longer time despite being in
oor health. These preferences are not signiﬁcantly affected by the
espondent’s own health or life satisfaction. Section 4 puts these
ndings in context and offers directions for future research.
. Data and methods
The data used in this study are part of a larger UK methodolog-
cal project in preparation for the re-valuation of the set of values
or the EQ-5D (for further details of the wider study, including the
ecruitment of the sample, see Tsuchiya and Mulhern, 2011). Our
ata consist of respondents’ own, personal, preferences to a series
f pairwise choices asking the respondent to imagine thepossibility
f not being in a perfect state of health – see Dolan et al. (2003) for
framework of different perspectives when eliciting preferences.
hese are of the following kind:
Scenario A: You live in health stateHwith satisfaction S for 5 years,
and then die.
Scenario B: You live in full health for 3 years, and then die.
The durations are ﬁxed at 5 years for scenario A and 3 years
or scenario B. These durations are arbitrarily selected and do
ot necessarily satisfy the constant proportional time trade-off
ssumption – postulating that respondents trade-off the same frac-
ion of life years irrespective of the duration of the health state –
or which the empirical evidence is somewhat mixed (Dolan and
talmeier, 2003; Craig, 2009).
Three hypothetical health states are used from the EQ-5D-5L,
here each consists of just one problem: ‘unable towalk’, ‘extreme
r
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ain’, and ‘extreme depression’ (Table A1 lists all ﬁve EQ dimen-
ions and levels of severity). These are combined with one of the
our satisfaction states – ‘high life satisfaction’ (High LS), ‘high
ealth satisfaction’ (High HS), ‘low life satisfaction’ (Low LS), ‘low
ealth satisfaction’ (Low HS) – and a situation described as ‘learnt
o live’ with the health condition. ‘High/low’ were chosen as there
s no ambiguity in which of the two is better. Table 1 summarises
he overall design.
Furthermore, all respondents of thewiderproject also answered
airwise choice questions based on a typical TTO scenario, where
cenario A was of the form: “You live in health state H for T years,
hen die”. We incorporate these data and estimate the probability
f respondent i choosing to live for3years in full health (scenarioB).
rivially, in order to attribute any differences in preferences to the
ntroduction of satisfaction levels, all other determinants inﬂuenc-
ng preferences must be held ﬁxed. For the ‘typical’ scenarios we
hus only consider those respondents with the same time trade-
ffs to be incorporated to our primary dataset – i.e. poor health for
=5 years and full health for 3 years.
For each of the three EQ-5D health dimensions included in this
tudy – i.e. ‘unable to walk’, ‘extreme pain’, and ‘extreme depres-
ion’ – we separately estimate the following probit model:
(B)i = ˇ0 +
∑
j
[ˇ1j(H × S)j] + ˇ2DEMOi + ˇ3HEALTHi
+ˇ4SWBi + εi (1)
here (H× S) denotes the combination of a health state (H) with
level of satisfaction (S) under scenario A. In this speciﬁcation,
he ‘typical’ scenario serves as the ‘neutral’ reference category
ithin each health dimension. Regression estimates resulting from
his estimation will hence capture any changes in preferences
ttributed to the introduction of satisfaction levels in the scenario
or a givenhealth dimension. The subscript j represents thenumber
f multi-attribute health states within a grouped EuroQol dimen-
ion. DEMO represents a set of demographic variables available for
he respondent – these are gender, age, age squared, marital sta-
us, employment status, and education level. HEALTH is a set of
5 dummy variables capturing respondents’ own state of health
btained from their completion of the EQ-5D-5L (Herdman et al.,
011). SWB represents subjective well-being, measured by a set
f self-reported satisfaction with life or health variables, each on
0–10 scale, with 0 denoting ‘not at all satisﬁed’ and 10 denot-
ng ‘completely satisﬁed’. As respondents face multiple scenarios
f health state–satisfaction combinations, we allow for the corre-
ation of the error term within, but not between, individuals by
stimating robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.
. Results
Table 2 describes the data. Of the 645 respondents who
nswered the relevant questions to this paper, just under half the
ample aremale, just over half aremarried and employed, just over
third have a degree. The average age is 42. About 73%, 87%, and
1% of the respondents do not have any problems with mobility,
elf-care, and performing usual activities, respectively. The corre-
ponding proportions for pain/discomfort and anxiety/depression
reabout45%and56%, respectively. Theproportionof those report-
ng the best state in EQ-5D-5L (i.e. 11111) is 31.6%.
Average own health satisfaction (SWBH) and life satisfaction
SWBL) are 6.4 and 6.3, with standard deviations of 2.6 and 2.5,
espectively. Thedistributionof these twomeasures is quite similar
oo: their correlation coefﬁcient is 0.67. Given this high correlation,
nclusion of both SWBH and SWBL in Eq. (1) will lead to problems
f multi-collinearity. Results presented here control only for SWBL,
710 P. Dolan et al. / Journal of Health Economics 32 (2013) 708–714
Table 1
Versions and states used in scenario A.
Version 1 Version 2 Version 3
Unable to walk and high LS Unable to walk and learnt to live Unable to walk and high HS
Extreme pain and learnt to live Unable to walk and low HS
Extreme pain and low HS Extreme pain and high LS
Extreme depression and high HS Extreme pain and high HS
Extreme depression and learnt to live
No. of respondents =213 =211 =221
No. of observations =852 =1055 =221
Note: LS and HS denote life satisfaction and health satisfaction, respectively.
No. of observations is ‘No. of respondents×number of states in version’.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Mean Own health in EQ-5D-5L Mean
Age 42.2
Male 43.1 Mobility level 1 72.6
Mobility level 2 14
Marital status Mobility level 3 7
Married 57.4 Mobility level 4 5.4
Separated 2.2 Mobility level 5 0.9
Divorced 9.6 Self-care level 1 87.3
Widowed 1.7 Self-care level 2 6.6
Self-care level 3 4.7
Employment status Self-care level 4 0.9
Employed 53.3 Self-care level 5 0.5
Retired 8.4 Usual activities level 1 71
Taking care of home 9.3 Usual activities level 2 13.9
Student 8.1 Usual activities level 3 10
Seeking work 4.7 Usual activities level 4 4.4
Unemployed 5.9 Usual activities level 5 0.6
Long-term sick 8.4 Pain/discomfort level 1 45.2
Pain/discomfort level 2 31.7
Education level Pain/discomfort level 3 15.3
Degree level 38.8 Pain/discomfort level 4 5.8
Below degree level 36 Pain/discomfort level 5 2
Anxiety/depression level 1 55.7
SWB Anxiety/depression level 2 23.6
Satisfaction with health (SWBH) 6.4 Anxiety/depression level 3 13.3
Low (0–5) 33.3 Anxiety/depression level 4 5
Medium (6–7) 26.1 Anxiety/depression level 5 2.5
High (8–9) 30.7
Very high (10) 9.9 Full health 31.6
Satisfaction with life (SWBL) 6.3
Low (0–5) 34.4
Medium (6–7) 29.6
High (8–9) 26.7
Very high (10) 9.3
N
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probit estimation of Eq. (1). We only report statistically signiﬁcant
estimates at the 5% level or higher for the remaining controls.
For ‘unable to walk’ (column 1), the probability of choos-
ing the full health scenario signiﬁcantly increases by 23% when
Table 3
Proportion of respondents choosing full health scenario (scenario B).
Unable to walk and high LS 53.1%
Unable to walk and high HS 56.6%
Unable to walk and learnt to live 58.3%
Extreme depression and learnt to live 70.6%
Extreme depression and high HS 70.9%
Extreme pain and high LS 71.1%ote: For the case of binary variables, means represent proportions (%).
lthough the implications of the results do not differ substantially
f controlling for SWBH instead.
In addition, followingDolan andMetcalfe (2011), wemerge lev-
ls of SWBH and SWBL into the following categories: ‘low’ if 0–5;
medium’ if 6–7; ‘high’ if 8–9; and ‘very high’ if 10. As noted in their
tudy, the justiﬁcation for separating those scoring 10 (the ‘tens’) is
ecause they are a little different from other respondents in ways
hatmight not be expected – they tend to be older and less healthy,
or example.
Pooling all observations from Table 1 (N=2128), the proportion
f respondents facing these scenarios choosing to live for 3 years in
ull health (scenario B) is 70.1%, ranging from 53.1% (for ‘unable
o walk and high LS’) to 90.1% (for ‘extreme pain and low HS’).
references towards the full health scenario for each combination
f health-satisfaction states are presented in Table 3.
We now turn to the results of the regression analysis, compar-
ng health state scenarios without any information on satisfaction
ith life or health (i.e. a ‘typical’ TTO scenario) to comparableealth state scenarios but which contain information on satisfac-
ion. Table 4 reportsmarginal effects coefﬁcients resulting from theExtreme pain and learnt to live 71.8%
Extreme pain and high HS 73%
Unable to walk and low HS 86.3%
Extreme pain and low HS 90.1%
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Table 4
Regressions grouped by health state.
(1)
‘Unable to
Walk’
(2)
‘Extreme pain’
(3)
‘Extreme
depression’
Health scenarios
Unable to walk and low HS 0.23** (0.043)
Unable to walk and high HS −0.121* (0.056)
Unable to walk and high LS −0.144* (0.057)
Unable to walk and learnt to live −0.096 (0.056)
Unable to walk Reference group
Extreme pain and low HS −0.071 (0.045)
Extreme pain and high HS −0.292** (0.051)
Extreme pain and high LS −0.316** (0.052)
Extreme pain and learnt to live −0.322** (0.052)
Extreme pain Reference group
Extreme depression and high HS −0.305** (0.051)
Extreme depression and learnt to live −0.301** (0.044)
Extreme depression Reference group
Demographics
Age 0.018* (0.007)
Age2 −0.0002* (0.0001)
Employment: retired 0.076* (0.037)
Employment: long-term sick 0.076* (0.037)
Employment: taking care of home −0.15* (0.068)
Education: below degree level 0.06* (0.03) 0.083* (0.041)
Own health in EQ-5D-5L
Mobility level 5 0.126** (0.034)
Usual activities level 2 0.104* (0.046)
Pain/discomfort level 2 −0.09* (0.045)
Pain/discomfort level 3 −0.134* (0.062)
Anxiety/depression level 2 −0.106* (0.051)
Anxiety/depression level 3 −0.14* (0.062) −0.193** (0.059) −0.162* (0.074)
Anxiety/depression level 4 −0.228** (0.087) −0.26* (0.111)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes
EQ-5D-5L Yes Yes Yes
SWBL Yes Yes Yes
N 972 1211 613
Pseudo-R2 0.094 0.173 0.164
Note: Regressions are probits. Dependent variable is the binary variable of choosing full health for three years. Coefﬁcients are marginal effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level within parentheses. Demographic base categories are: being single (marital status), employed (employment status), having no degree
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meducation), low SWBL, and all level 1 severities for EQ-5D-5L dimensions.
* p<0.05.
** p<0.01.
espondents face a lowHS. In contrast, when this level of severity is
ombined with either high HS or LS, the probability of choosing the
ull health scenario decreases by about 12 and 14%, respectively.
his implies that respondents prefer to copewith the extreme level
f severity of this health dimension for a longer time period when
hey are more satisﬁed with their health/life. Learning to live with
he condition has no statistically signiﬁcant effect on preferences.
his seems to suggest that individuals anticipate coming to terms
ith the mobility problem even when this additional information
s not given.
For ‘extreme pain’ (column 2), the addition of low HS does
ot have a signiﬁcant effect on preferences, suggesting that low
S is in line with what people associate with extreme pain.
n accordance with the results for the mobility dimension, the
resence of high HS or LS reduces the probability of choosing the
ull health scenario by 29 and 32%, respectively. The presence
f ‘learnt to live’ also reduces the probability of choosing the
ull health scenario by about 32%. In other words, individuals
re not anticipating learning to live with pain when it is not
ndicated.For ‘extreme depression’ (column 3), the effect of ‘high HS’ and
learnt to live’ is similar to the corresponding effects of the other
wo health dimensions, reducing the probability of choosing full
ealth by about 30%.
(
l
s
sLooking across the columns, the relative ordering between high
S and high HS is consistent, but the relative ordering of learnt to
ive is not. Thismay be interpreted to suggest that themeaning and
he value of learning to live with a health condition depend heavily
n the state. Own satisfaction levels with life (SWBL) do not appear
ohave a statistically signiﬁcant effect on respondents’ preferences.
Turning to demographic variables for ‘extreme pain’ (column 2)
reference towards the full-health scenario signiﬁcantly increases
ith age, a below-degree education, the retired, and among those
ut of employmentdue to long-termsickness. Abelow-degree edu-
ation has a similar effect towards the preference for full health for
extreme depression’ (column 3). Here, in addition, those taking
are of the home are less likely to choose full health (i.e. prefer on
verage to live longer being depressed rather than a shorter time
n full health).
The effect of respondents’ own health in EQ-5D on health state
references is interesting to note here. On average, individuals
aluing ‘extreme pain’ and ‘extreme depression’ tend to opt for
he full health scenario if they already have problems of extreme
obility (level 5) and slight problemsof performingusual activitieslevel 2), respectively. Notably, respondents with existing prob-
ems in pain and depression prefer living longer when faced with
tates of ‘extreme pain’ and ‘extreme depression’, controlling for
atisfaction in these states.
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. Discussion
This study seeks to answer whether preferences over health
cenarios of differing quality of life and duration are inﬂuenced
y satisfaction levels introduced in those states. Satisfaction with
ife or health matters to individuals’ well-being, and incorporating
his information in a health state offers a concise and informative
ommunication of the experience of living in a hypothetical poor
tate of health. In addition,weexaminewhether health state values
hich contain satisfaction levels are inﬂuencedby the respondent’s
wn satisfaction level. The answer to the ﬁrst hypothesis is ‘very
uch so’, and to the second ‘not very likely to be’.
A scenario that contains low health satisfaction leads to a sig-
iﬁcant increase in the likelihood of preferring to die sooner in
ull health. A notable exception to this ﬁnding is the health state
ssociated with ‘extreme pain’, where the addition of low HS
oes not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on preferences. This
ould be explained by respondents assuming that extreme pain
s associated with low HS in the ﬁrst place. Similarly, a scenario
hat contains a high satisfaction with either health or life leads
o a signiﬁcant increase in the likelihood of preferring to live for
longer time in poor health rather than a shorter time in full
ealth.
In contrast, it seems that own life satisfaction of the respondent
s generally not inﬂuencing health state preferences. Repeating the
nalyses with own health satisfaction instead does not alter this
onclusion. Generally speaking, demographic variables are seldom
tatistically signiﬁcant.
On average, respondents facing states of ‘extreme pain’ and
extreme depression’ prefer living for longer in those states when
hey themselves have existing problems on the pain and depres-
ion dimensions. A plausible explanation for this tendency might
e the belief that extreme pain or depression which they are asked
o value cannot be much worse than the existing level of pain or
epression they are experiencing – or the fact that havinghad some
roblems with those health conditions already, they will be able to
ope with even more severe cases of these (i.e. a “how much worse
an it be?” effect).
The results found in this study could potentially be attributed
o adaptation. Typically, though not always, our levels of SWB, such
s life satisfaction, will adapt to changes in health (Riis et al., 2005;
olan and Kahneman, 2008). It seems that there is adaptation to
ome forms of disability (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008; Pagán-
odríguez, 2010) andheart problems (Wu, 2001), but not tomental
ealth problems (Dolan et al., 2011). Bradford and Dolan (2010)
se satisfaction data to explain adaptation in terms of the weights
ttached to different domains of life (e.g. health, work, leisure),
hich are adjusted following changed circumstances in order to
aintain overall life satisfaction. Thus, a scenario containing either
igh health or life satisfaction could indirectly reﬂect a degree of
daptation.
This study does not come without limitations. First, it focuses
n just three of the ﬁve dimensions of the EQ-5D – mobility,
ain/discomfort and anxiety/depression. Second, it only assesses
hese states at their correspondingextreme levels of severity. Third,
he duration of the scenarios was held constant. Furthermore, the
ffect of providing these additional information in health state
aluation exercises is unlikely to be additive. This is in line with
hat was observed in a bolt-on study that conducted a valuation
f EQ-5D with an additional dimension on sleep problems; Yang
t al. (forthcoming) ﬁnd interactions between the main dimen-
ions of EQ-5D and the additional dimension. In our study, we do
ot have enough comparisons across enough scenarios to make
ny ﬁrm claims about the robustness of the ﬁndings offered here
o other combinations. Without question there is need for more
t
p
w
aonomics 32 (2013) 708–714
esearch in incorporating the experience of living in poor health
or valuation of health states. Future research could, for example,
onsider expanding thedimensions, levels of severity, andduration
f scenarios studied here, and accounting for possible interactions
mongst these.
We also needmore attempts directly incorporating information
n adaptation in the valuation of health states. Use of ‘adaptation
xercises’ has been suggested (Damschroder et al., 2005, 2008)
nd these could potentially be developed even further. Using this
ethod,McTaggart-Cowanet al. (2011) have recently attempted to
eﬁne TTO preferences, where people valuing certain health states
re presented with audio-recordings of patients explaining how
hey got used to live in those states. The information on adaptation
s found to positively inﬂuence the valuation of these health states.
Arguably though, adaptationexercisesdonot comewithout lim-
tations of their own. The immediate question that arises is whose
nformation should be included, as surely not all patients adapt to
he same degree to a certain health condition. Moreover, includ-
ng information on speciﬁc patient experience would compromise
he generic nature of instruments such as the EQ-5D. Furthermore,
ompared to a ‘simple’ TTO or pairwise choice, the complexity of
daptation exercises means that individuals must devote a sub-
tantial amount of time and attention in order to digest the full
nformation provided (e.g. by listening to audio-recordings).
Preferences could also potentially be elicited from people who
ave experienced the health state in question, or know someone
hohas experienced or is experiencing the state. The obvious chal-
enge with this approach then is identifying and sampling those
eople with the most appropriate levels of experience of a given
ealth state, and it is not clear where ‘inexperienced’ stops and
experienced’ starts (Dolan, 1999). In addition, there is the concern
hat those who have experienced the state for long enough may
hen treat the full health scenario of the TTO as ‘becoming’ fully
ealthy instead of ‘being’ fully healthy.
A further alternative is to consider using measures of subjective
ell-being (suchas life satisfaction)directly tomakehealth-related
aluations and inform policy decisions (Dolan et al., 2009; Dolan,
011). For example, Dolan et al. (2012) estimate the impact of
imensions of the SF-6D on life satisfaction and show the biggest
ecrements are associated with mental health. Consistent with
his, Graham et al. (2011) show that anxiety/depression in the EQ-
D has the biggest effect on life satisfaction in a Latin American
ample. Similar conclusions on dimensions of both the EQ-5D and
he SF-6D are reached using patient data (Mukuria and Brazier,
013). Crucially, these studies are at odds with the relative impact
f different dimensions of health on people’s preferences, where
roblems with mobility feature much more prominently (Brazier
t al., 2002; Dolan, 1997), but are not free of limitations of their
wn – for example, valuations differ depending on the measure of
ubjective well-being used (Powdthavee and van den Berg, 2011).
Adaptation processes naturally raise normative issues about
hether, when allocating health care resources to improve peo-
le’s health, thosewhohave adapted themost should receive lower
riority in healthcare as a result of the laudable effort associated
ith coming to terms with their condition – or whether we should
ccept more experienced suffering in the world in order to reward
hosewhoexpendedeffort inadapting to their condition. This study
annot resolve this “vexing moral problem” (Murray, 1996) and
nterested readers should see Menzel et al. (2002) for an overview
f the ethical issues.
What the study does do, however, is shed light on the impor-
ance of a related normative debate – namely, the degree to which
references should be “informed desires” (Harsanyi, 1985). Those
ho favour a preference satisfaction account of welfare generally
rgue that thosepreferences should include “information regarding
P. Dolan et al. / Journal of Health Economics 32 (2013) 708–714 713
Table A1
EQ-5D-5L and EQ-5D-3L.
EQ-5D-5L EQ-5D-3L
Mobility 1. I have no problems in walking about I have no problems in walking about
2. I have slight problems in walking about I have some problems in walking about
3. I have moderate problems in walking about I am conﬁned to bed
4. I have severe problems in walking about
5. I am unable to walk about
Self-care 1. I have no problems washing or dressing myself I have no problems with self-care
2. I have slight problems washing or dressing myself I have some problems washing or dressing myself
3. I have moderate problems washing or dressing myself I am unable to wash or dress myself
4. I have severe problems washing or dressing myself
5. I am unable to wash or dress myself
Usual activities 1. I have no problems doing my usual activities I have no problems with performing my usual activities
2. I have slight problems doing my usual activities I have some problems with performing my usual activities
3. I have moderate problems doing my usual activities I am unable to perform my usual activities
4. I have severe problems doing my usual activities
5. I am unable to do my usual activities
Pain/discomfort 1. I have no pain or discomfort I have no pain or discomfort
2. I have slight pain or discomfort I have moderate pain or discomfort
3. I have moderate pain or discomfort I have extreme pain or discomfort
4. I have severe pain or discomfort
5. I have extreme pain or discomfort
Anxiety/depression 1. I am not anxious or depressed I am not anxious or depressed
2. I am slightly anxious or depressed I am moderately anxious or depressed
3. I am moderately anxious or depressed I am extremely anxious or depressed
4. I am severely anxious or depressed
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ource: EQ-5D-3L and EQ-5D-5L User Guides, April 2011. www.euroqol.org/about-e
he experiential quality of some feature of outcomes” (Adler, 2012,
. 214). Insofar as information about the satisfaction level associ-
ted with a health state is seen as relevant additional information,
e have shown that “better informed” preferences are different
rom “less informed” ones.
In the very least, therefore, future studies should consider the
mpact on health state preferences of different types and levels of
nformation about the future experiences of those preferences. In
his way, empirical data can illuminate the debate about what sort
f preferences (if indeed any) should be used to value health and
ther beneﬁts.
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